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THE AMBIGUITY OF GATT ARTICLE XXI:
SUBTLE SUCCESS OR RAMPANT FAILURE?
PETER LINDSAY
INTRODUCTION
International trade regulation has grown increasingly prominent
since the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created in 1994.1 The
WTO incorporated by reference the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), which had been in use since 1947.2 Article XXI
of GATT 1994 permits WTO members to breach their GATT
obligations for national security reasons.3 The broadest and most
Copyright © 2003 by Peter Lindsay.
1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1154, para. 1(a) (1994). The Uru-
guay Round added several “understandings” to the GATT 1947, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT],
which has been amended several times since 1947. The GATT governs trade relations between
its signatories, including, inter alia, permissible uses of tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Al-
though the GATT includes specific trade concessions on tariff levels, it also includes more gen-
eralized obligations not to discriminate against foreign trade in goods. GATT art. I (containing
Most Favored Nation obligations); id. art. III (listing national treatment duties).
3. Id. art. XXI. Article XXI provides that
Nothing in [the GATT] shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which
it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to
such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for
the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
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controversial of the exceptions included in Article XXI states that the
GATT will not prevent a WTO member “from taking any action
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests . . . taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations.”4 This exception confers a potentially broad grant of
authority, because the GATT does not define critical terms such as
“considers necessary,” “essential security interests,” “time of war,”
and “emergency in international relations.” Consequently, the scope
of the “war” and “emergency” exception in Article XXI is not readily
discernible. Similarly, the fact that a WTO member may take any
action to protect “essential” interests that “it considers necessary”
leaves open the question of whether the use of Article XXI is subject
to review by a WTO panel.
Although some scholars suggest that the invocation of Article
XXI is reviewable under the dispute settlement mechanisms of
GATT Article XXIII,5 the question of whether a WTO (or previously
a GATT) panel has jurisdiction over this exception has never been
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obliga-
tions under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace
and security.
Before the World Trade Organization was formed, signatories to GATT 1947 were known as
“contracting parties.”
4. Id. art. XXI(b). Although subparagraph (b) also permits action to protect “essential
security interests” relating to fissionable materials, traffic in arms, and the supply of a military
establishment, the most widespread and controversial use of Article XXI stems from its invoca-
tion relating to war and international emergencies. Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff,
“Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of
Competence, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 424, 431 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the
WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New
Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413, 420 (2001) (arguing
that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body should develop standards for reviewing use of the secu-
rity exception); Antonio F. Perez, To Judge Between the Nations: Post Cold War Transforma-
tions in National Security and Separation of Powers—Beating Nuclear Swords into Plowshares in
an Imperfectly Competitive World, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 408–10 (1997)
(contending that because the WTO dispute settlement bodies have a more adjudicative role
than the previous arbitration system, they have more power to interpret substantive law, in-
cluding the security exception); Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 4, at 426–27 (asserting that
the WTO dispute settlement bodies have “authority to interpret GATT law,” including Article
XXI). GATT Article XXIII, along with the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), permit a WTO member to petition for a WTO panel to decide
if the member’s benefits under the GATT have been nullified or impaired by the actions of an-
other member. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 112, art.
6 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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definitively settled. Through an examination of the WTO’s previous
approaches to similar issues, this Note offers new evidence for why a
panel might not assert jurisdiction. This evidence includes (1) a recent
arbitration in which a WTO panel confronted language similar to that
used in Article XXI, and (2) current arguments over the interpreta-
tion of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
Although I conclude that a WTO panel would likely assert jurisdic-
tion over disputes involving Article XXI, my analysis demonstrates
that both advocates and opponents of jurisdiction have strong argu-
ments and that the issue presents a close question.
The second Part of this Note argues that it is important to appre-
ciate the tension regarding jurisdiction, because this tension drives
WTO members to resolve informally disputes that contain national
security concerns. Rather than refer the matter to a panel, WTO
members have often relied on international pressure and diplomacy
to resolve Article XXI trade disputes. A desire to retain the construc-
tive ambiguity of Article XXI drives, at least in part, this informal,
diplomatic resolution process. This approach does not necessarily
represent a failure of the current system. Rather, it can be viewed as a
success because it encourages nations to resolve disputes without re-
sorting to a third-party adjudicator, and it affords states an appropri-
ate amount of flexibility to deal with sensitive issues of national secu-
rity.
Part I explores the jurisdictional question behind Article XXI. It
compares the arguments and counterarguments for why a WTO panel
would claim jurisdiction over Article XXI national security defenses.
The Note concludes that a WTO dispute settlement body would likely
assert jurisdiction over Article XXI defenses. Part II explains why,
even if a WTO panel could assert jurisdiction, parties to an Article
XXI dispute face incentives to settle the dispute outside of formal
WTO processes and how such incentives serve as a check against in-
appropriate use of the national security exception.
Before beginning an analysis of a WTO panel’s jurisdiction over
Article XXI, however, a preliminary objection must first be
addressed. According to one argument, the question of whether a
WTO panel has the necessary jurisdiction to determine an Article
XXI claim is inconsequential, because, at step one, the WTO body is
not the proper body to resolve certain disputes in which an Article
XXI claim would be made. This argument asserts that the WTO lacks
jurisdiction over such disputes because they involve only peripheral
trade concerns. Thus, the WTO would never get to the point of
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deciding whether they had jurisdiction to hear an Article XXI defense
if the dispute encompasses primarily political and national security
issues rather than trade concerns. Consistent with this argument,
some countries have refused to submit disputes to a GATT panel,
because the issues involved transcended matters of trade, even
though the countries could have invoked Article XXI with respect to
any trade elements.6 This argument is especially persuasive when the
WTO claims are “inextricably linked” to “other rules of international
law,” so that the WTO claims could not be decided independently of
these other rules.7
This argument has several weaknesses. First, in many situations,
the trade claims are significant enough that parties will not be able to
argue persuasively that the WTO lacks jurisdiction over the entire
dispute. Second, an alternative view suggests that the WTO does have
jurisdiction over disputes containing both trade elements and other
issues. This position is advanced by Article XXIII of the Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes (DSU).8 DSU Article 23 provides that “[w]hen Members seek
the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or im-
pairment of benefits under the covered agreements . . . they shall have
recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Under-
standing.”9 The mandatory language suggests that parties claiming an
impairment of GATT benefits must bring these claims before the
WTO dispute settlement bodies.10 WTO jurisprudence supports this
view. A WTO panel retains jurisdiction over a trade dispute despite
the fact that the WTO’s political organs may also be considering the
6. See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 601 (updated
6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL INDEX] (describing how the terms of reference of a
GATT panel precluded it from examining the validity of an Article XXI defense by the United
States in a military dispute with Nicaragua that also involved trade sanctions); cf. United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, paras. 35–36 (noting Iran’s
argument that its dispute with the United States should be viewed in all of its historical com-
plexity and not focused only on the hostage situation).
7. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2003) (manu-
script at 452, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
8. The DSU provides the framework and rules for WTO members to claim a violation of
GATT obligations or impairment of GATT benefits by another WTO member. See supra note 5
and accompanying text.
9. DSU, supra note 5, art. 23.1 (emphasis added).
10. PAUWELYN, supra note 7, at 451.
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issues.11 Because other tribunals have asserted jurisdiction over com-
plex disputes with several dimensions, it is difficult for a WTO mem-
ber to assert that a WTO panel would not have jurisdiction over such
a dispute.12 Thus, a WTO panel would likely reject such arguments.
But even if a WTO panel may initially dismiss claims that it lacks
jurisdiction over complex disputes involving multiple issues, it must
still contend with challenges to its authority over GATT Article XXI
claims. For this reason, this Note focuses on the jurisdictional scope
of Article XXI and assumes that a WTO member could not remove
the dispute from the WTO because of the presence of nontrade ele-
ments.
I.  WTO JURISDICTION OVER GATT ARTICLE XXI
A. Evidence Disfavoring Jurisdiction
This Section presents evidence against WTO jurisdiction in Arti-
cle XXI disputes. This evidence includes textual interpretations of
Article XXI, recent interpretations of other WTO declarations, a de-
cision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and historical in-
terpretations and use of Article XXI by WTO members. Although
some of these arguments are not new, I review them here to demon-
strate the weight of the evidence disfavoring jurisdiction.
Interpretations of international agreements begin with the proto-
cols established by the Vienna Convention.13 The WTO dispute set-
tlement bodies have used these protocols in construing the GATT.14
11. Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial and the Political Or-
gans of the WTO, Paper Presented at Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral
Trading System at the Millennium, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univer-
sity (June 1–2, 2000), at http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/cbg/Conferences/trade/roessler.htm (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
12. Cf. PAUWELYN, supra note 7, manuscript at 452 (noting the International Court of Jus-
tice’s (ICJ) rejection of arguments by Iran that the ICJ should not adjudicate the hostage situa-
tion without considering twenty-five years of history and dealing between the United States and
Iran).
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, arts. 31–
33, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 340, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 691–94 (1969).
14. The DSU provides that its provisions are to be used to clarify the GATT and other
covered agreements “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public interna-
tional law.” DSU, supra note 5, art. 3.2. The WTO Appellate Body has determined that portions
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties constitute customary rules of interpretation of
public international law. WTO Appellate Body Report on United States—Standards for Re-
formulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), http://www.wto.org/
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One protocol provides that treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”15
This rule is of minimal help in connection with GATT Article XXI,
however, because Article XXI’s “ordinary meaning” is not easily dis-
cernible in light of its context, object, and purpose. Another protocol
looks to state practice to assist in questions of interpretation.16 Al-
though not decisive, state practice sheds some light on the interpreta-
tion of Article XXI.17
The plain text of Article XXI suggests that a WTO panel would
not have the necessary jurisdiction to decide an Article XXI disputes.
Article XXI differs from other textually defined exceptions to the
GATT, because it appears to permit the WTO member itself to de-
fine the scope of the exception. The exception states that the GATT
does not prevent a WTO member “from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security inter-
ests.”18 Thus, the self-defining nature of the national security excep-
tion suggests a subjective standard for assessing the necessity of a
measure under Article XXI. In contrast, other GATT exceptions sug-
gest an objective standard—a standard under which WTO judicial
bodies may define “necessary” and examine measures against this
definition.19
Recent interpretations of other WTO declarations also provide
some support for the self-defining nature of Article XXI. The
english/docs_e/docs_e.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter WTO Gasoline
Report] (making such a determination for Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties).
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at
340.
16. Id. art. 31(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340; see infra notes 35–37, 67–72 and accompanying
text.
17. See infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
18. GATT, supra note 2, art. XXI(b) (emphasis added).
19. Article XX, for example, provides an exception for compliance with GATT obligations
based on measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” id. art.
XX(I)(b), or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,” id. art. XX(I)(g). In
a series of cases, WTO panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted key terms in Article XX
(including “necessary”) and developed a legal framework, under Article XXIII, for determining
when the exception may be used. See WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communi-
ties—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/ AB/R (Mar.
12, 2001), paras. 26–29, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/docs_e.htm (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (interpreting GATT art. XX(I)(b)); WTO Gasoline Report, supra note 14 (inter-
preting GATT art. XX(I)(g)).
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS agreement) protects the intellectual property rights of indi-
viduals whose governments belong to the WTO.20 The TRIPS agree-
ment permits members, however, to abrogate those rights if “the pro-
posed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right
holder.”21 A WTO member may waive this requirement “in the case
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme ur-
gency.”22 Recent negotiations in the Doha Round have clarified the
use of this waiver for developing countries.23 Recognizing the incredi-
ble health crises faced by many third-world countries and their in-
ability to pay for licenses on patented medicines, the Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Declaration), adopted in
Doha, in November of 2001, provides that “[e]ach member has the
right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other cir-
cumstances of extreme urgency.”24 The Declaration also calls for a sys-
tem of compulsory licensing, whereby nations facing a public health
emergency could, independent of the wishes of the patent holder, li-
cense domestic and foreign manufacturers to produce the critical
medicine.25
The interpretation of the Declaration is currently a subject of
great debate within the WTO, representing an obstacle in the pro-
gression of the Doha Round. Concerned that developing countries
will broadly engage in compulsory licensing of foreign manufacturers,
20. Preface, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter TRIPS Agreement].
21. Id. art. 31(b).
22. Id.
23. The Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar (Doha Round), produced a
“November 2001 declaration [that] . . . provides the mandate for negotiations on a range of
subjects and other work, including issues concerning the implementation of the present
agreements.” Negotiations, Implementation and Development: The Doha Agenda, at http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
24. Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, (Nov. 20, 2001), para. 5(c), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/docs_e.htm
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
25. Id. paras. 5–6. Paragraph 6 instructs:
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in
the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compul-
sory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to
find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council be-
fore the end of 2002.
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the United States has attempted to limit the use of this authority to
specific “infectious diseases and epidemics.”26 Developing nations
have challenged this interpretation, asserting that the language and
purpose of the Declaration suggest that the compulsory licensing de-
cision is self-judging.27 Both sides have rejected compromises that at-
tempted to give the authority to another body to decide which dis-
eases would allow compulsory licensing.28 Hence, the stage is set for a
26. U.S. Rejects EC’s Formula to Resolve TRIPS, Health Issues, FIN. EXPRESS, Jan. 19,
2003 (describing how the United States blocked a compromise by the EU that would have al-
lowed foreign compulsory licensing for certain diseases and oversight by the World Health Or-
ganization for other diseases); see also Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative, Press
Conference at the Sheraton Hotel, Pretoria, South Africa (Jan. 13, 2003) (citing concerns about
the burgeoning number of countries that wanted to take advantage of foreign compulsory li-
censing and an expanding list of suspect diseases that could qualify as an “emergency need”)
(transcript at 2003 WL 2045596). Alan Sykes has suggested that the compulsory licensing provi-
sions of the Declaration may hinder public health advances in developing nations over the long
run by reducing incentives to develop internal research capacities within the developing nations.
Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 47, 55–66 (2002).
27. Editorial, The Importance of Patent Remedies: A Deal on Trade in Essential Medicines
Must Be Reached, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 3, 2003, at 14 (suggesting that the United States
blocked agreement on compulsory licensing because of pressure from the pharmaceutical
lobby); Sandy Thomas, Letter to the Editor, Problems of Making Low-Cost Medicines, FIN.
TIMES (London), Jan. 8, 2003, at 18 (presenting the opinion of a former member of the United
Kingdom Commission on Intellectual Property Rights: U.S. attempts to block agreement on
compulsory licensing ignore the original purpose of the Declaration, which reaffirms nations’
“freedom to issue compulsory licences [sic] on grounds of their own choosing”); RP and EU
Remain at Odds Over Drug Import Licenses, BUS. WORLD (Phillipines), Jan. 21, 2003, at 2
(quoting Manuel A. Roxas, II, Philippine Trade and Industry Secretary):
‘The Philippines finds that EU’s proposal [sic] on the determination of the scope of
diseases detracts from the flexibility granted by the TRIPS Declaration which allows
countries to determine on their own what constitutes public health problems without
need of confirmation or advice by any other country or international organization. . . .
The Philippines has never agreed with this premise as it erodes the broad and com-
prehensive scope of public health problems agreed upon by ministers in Doha.’
Frustrated by the lack of progress on the Declaration, Supachai Panitchpakdi, director-general
of the WTO, commented that “There are hundreds of diseases which need treatment . . . [m]ost
members do not think the definition of diseases is necessary.” Carol Goar, Editorial, AIDS Re-
lief Lost in the Desert, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 24, 2003, at A22.
28. Japanese Bid to Break WTO Impasse on Access to Cheap Medicines, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Feb. 5, 2003 (outlining Japanese proposal to allow compulsory foreign licensing for ad-
ditional diseases as decided by WTO TRIPS Council and the rejection of this proposal by sev-
eral African nations); Developing Countries Should Have Greater Access to Drugs: Phillipines,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 21, 2003 (describing the EU compromise that allowed foreign li-
censes for twenty-two diseases and the possibility for more if approved by the World Health
Organization); Pascal Lamy, The Doha Development Agenda, the European Union—and the
Commonwealth, Global Dimensions Lecture Series, London School of Economics (Jan. 20,
2003), at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/globalDimensions/lectures/lamy/transcript.htm (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (detailing the United States’s rejection of the EU compromise)  .
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debate over whether certain language from the Declaration is self-
defining. Accordingly, the self-defining interpretation of Article XXI
will be strengthened if the parties eventually agree that an “emer-
gency” under the Declaration is self-judging.29 Regardless of how the
compulsory licensing issue is resolved, the debate evidences the vi-
ability of an interpretive argument based on a self-judging analysis.
The intense debate shows that WTO members have not dismissed the
self-defining argument as outdated. Instead, they have confronted the
implications of the argument even in a trade environment of greater
legalism and multilateralism.
Other international tribunals have considered the significance
and interpretation of the “it considers” clause. The ICJ interpreted
this clause when it examined treaty language that allowed a national
security exception to certain treaty obligations.30 In 1986, the ICJ con-
sidered claims brought by Nicaragua against the United States for
violations of a 1956 treaty.31 The treaty permitted either signatory to
take action “necessary to protect its essential security interests.”32 The
ICJ decided that this clause did not preclude it from evaluating U.S.
attempts to invoke the national security exception to the treaty. It
noted that, unlike GATT Article XXI, the 1956 treaty mandated an
objective standard of review, (the national security measure must be
“necessary”) instead of the subjective standard implied by the GATT
(the country may take measures “it considers necessary”).33
This subjective reading of GATT Article XXI is also supported
by the comments of various WTO members made throughout the
history of the GATT. As early as 1949, GATT Council discussions
29. The definition of a “national emergency” under the TRIPS Agreement is not identical
to Article XXI’s exception to the GATT for actions “taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations,” GATT art. XXI(b)(iii). In both instances, though, the “emergency”
deals with an exception to WTO obligations based on matters of great national importance to
the invoking member.
30. Cann, supra note 5, at 422–23.
31. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 22 (June 27) (con-
sidering alleged violations of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 21,
1956, U.S.-Nicar., 9 U.S.T. 465).
32. Id. at 116 (quoting Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, supra note 31, art.
21(1)(d)).
33. Id. at 116–17.
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included a statement that “every country must be the judge in the last
resort on questions relating to its own security.”34
Later, in 1961, Ghana justified its boycott of Portuguese goods
under Article XXI(b)(iii): “[U]nder [Article XXI] each contracting
party was the sole judge of what was necessary in its essential security
interest. There could therefore be no objection to Ghana regarding
the boycott of goods as justified by security interests.”35 Similarly, in
1982, the European Economic Community (EEC) justified its trade
restrictions against Argentina during the Falkland/Malvinas contro-
versy on the basis of its “inherent rights, of which Article XXI of the
General Agreement was a reflection.”36 Reinforcing the EEC’s view,
the United States representative at that time asserted that “[t]he
General Agreement left to each contracting party the judgment as to
what it considered to be necessary to protect its security interests. The
contracting parties had no power to question that judgment.”37
B. Evidence Favoring Jurisdiction
Despite the evidence favoring a self-judging interpretation of Ar-
ticle XXI, WTO judicial bodies will likely exercise jurisdiction to re-
view disputes involving the national security exception.38 The evi-
dence favoring such jurisdiction includes textual interpretations of
Article XXI that limit the self-judging language, WTO interpretations
of similar self-defining language in other WTO agreements, and his-
torical interpretations of Article XXI.
Even though much has been made of the discretionary language
in Article XXI, the language may not preclude WTO jurisdiction.
Hannes L. Schloemann and Stefan Ohlhoff advance a textual inter-
pretation of Article XXI that retains a self-defining element, while
still permitting review of national security defenses by WTO judicial
34. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 6, at 600 (quoting EPCT/A/PV/33, p. 20–21 and
Corr.3). This statement arose in the context of a dispute between the United States and Czecho-
slovakia in which the United States invoked Article XXI. See infra notes 67–70 and accompa-
nying text.
35. Id. (quoting SR.19/12, p. 196).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 601 (quoting C/M/159, p. 19). This view is not simply a historical anachronism.
Jeffrey Schott, an economist with the Institute of International Economics, asserts that defend-
ing actions “based on national security considerations . . . is a virtually bulletproof defense” un-
der international trade law. Paul Blustein, Ruling Sought on U.S. Trade Law: EU Complaint to
Force a Legal Showdown Over the Embargo on Cuba, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1997, at D10.
38. Cann, supra note 5, at 425–29; Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 4, at 438–41.
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bodies. They maintain that, while WTO members may freely define
what is “necessary” for the protection of their “essential security in-
terests,”39 the members’ determination of whether “war or other
emergency” exists is reviewable by a WTO panel on a good faith
standard.40 Extending the “self-defining” element to the second part
of Article XXI, the scholars note, would vitiate the restrictive or lim-
iting intent of Article XXI.41 This interpretation would essentially
permit a WTO member to decide what national security measure it
may take, while subjecting the decision of when the party may take
the measure to an objective review. This paradigm is not without po-
tential problems, but it does represent a solution to the textual co-
nundrum created by the “it considers” language of Article XXI.42
39. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 4, at 444. They also maintain that this definitional
prerogative would not extend to “security interests that are entirely a function of the economic
capacities, activities and effects that are the very substance of WTO law.” Id.
40. Id. at 446–47. Schloemann and Ohlhoff acknowledge, however, that another scholar has
concluded that a “good faith” determination under Article XXI would not be reviewable. Id. at
448 n.126 (citing David D. Knoll, The Impact of Security Concerns upon International Economic
Law, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 567, 586–90 (1984)). The good faith argument is also
embodied in the international law concept of abus de droit. The abus de droit concept “refers to
a State exercising a right either in a way which impedes the enjoyment by other States of their
own rights or for an end different from that for which the right was created, to the injury of an-
other State.” Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992); see also Dapo Akande & Sope Williams,
International Adjudication on National Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J. INT’L
L. 365, 390–91 (2003) (suggesting an interpretation of Article XXI that incorporates the princi-
ple of abus de droit under DSU art. 3.2).
41. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 4, at 447–48.
42. Several potential problems may exist under the Schloemann-Ohlhoff framework. Al-
though Schloemann and Ohlhoff argue that the decision of whether war exists is a determina-
tion that has long been committed to international law, id. at 445, international law offers few
clear answers on these issues—particularly in the trade context. See Clinton E. Cameron, Note,
Developing a Standard for Politically Related State Economic Action, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 218,
223–29, 253 (1991) (“The legal regulation of the use of economic diplomacy is one of the most
unclear areas of international law.”). The current war against terrorism (against both state and
nonstate actors) offers evidence that the definition of “war” and “emergency” may always be in
flux, as well as a nation’s views of what constitutes “essential security interests.” See The Na-
tional Security Strategy of the United States of America 13–16, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
nsc/nss.html (Sept. 17, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (adopting the doctrine of pre-
emptive self-defense to protect national interests).
Assuming that the use of force or “war” is defined and authorized in a given situation, as
it might be in the case of a U.N. Security Council resolution, WTO judicial bodies might rea-
sonably rely on this determination in adjudicating Article XXI disputes. See Raj Bhala, National
Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT Says, and What the United States Does,
19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 275–76 (1998) (suggesting increased coordination between the
WTO and the United Nations Security Council in situations in which a WTO member invokes
Article XXI(b)). But absent this clear direction, a WTO panel may hesitate to interject itself in
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WTO action in other areas in which it has examined the “it con-
siders” language also suggests that a WTO panel would find jurisdic-
tion to review a national security defense. For instance, a WTO arbi-
tration on the suspension of concessions has confronted this
language.43 The DSU provides a general hierarchy of preferences for
how parties should seek to suspend concessions in response to an un-
remedied violation.44 First, the party should “seek to suspend conces-
sions . . . [in] the same sector(s)” in which the original violation oc-
curred,45 or if that is not practicable, within the same agreement.46
Second, DSU Article 22.3(c) provides that if the “party considers that
it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions . . . with re-
spect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circum-
stances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions . . .
under another covered agreement.”47 Allowing suspension of conces-
sions when the “party considers that it is not practicable” implies the
same discretion provided by the “it considers” language of GATT Ar-
ticle XXI.
The WTO Appellate Body interpreted the discretionary provi-
sions of DSU Article 22.3(c) in a WTO arbitration between Ecuador
a process that could politicize the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms. Antonio F. Perez,
WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 365–75
(1998) (asserting that the WTO should consider giving comity in the security lawmaking of the
U.N., because U.N. processes represent a more democratic and balanced method to develop
such jurisprudence and practice).
Finally, deciding that Article XXI is, at least in part, subject to an objective review does
not answer the question of what level of scrutiny a WTO panel should apply. The heavier the
scrutiny becomes, the greater the danger that the objective review begins to define the “essen-
tial security interest” and not simply assure that is used at the appropriate time. Questions of
when an essential security interest may be protected by Article XXI are not easily separated
from definition of an “essential security interest” itself. A heavy-handed approach to reviewing
Article XXI(b) simply becomes a backdoor to defining an essential security interest, because
such a determination means very little outside its use to invoke the national security exception.
43. When a WTO dispute settlement body has determined that a measure violates the
GATT, the member who imposed the measure has an obligation to eliminate the measure and
bring its actions in conformity with the GATT or make compensation. JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND
TEXT 266–67 (4th ed. 2002). If the member does not eliminate the offensive measure within a
reasonable period of time, the complaining party then has the opportunity to suspend conces-
sions. DSU, supra note 5, art. 22.1. The GATT violator may also voluntarily offer compensation
to the complaining party in lieu of following the recommendations and rulings of the dispute
settlement body. Id.
44. Id. art. 22.3.
45. Id. art. 22.3(a).
46. Id. art. 22.3(b).
47. Id. art. 22.3(c) (emphasis added).
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and the European Communities (EC).48 The EC had violated the
GATT by installing a licensing regime for the importation of bananas
that favored EC importers.49 After the EC failed to withdraw the
measure, Ecuador retaliated by suspending concessions, not under
the GATT, but under the intellectual property provisions of an en-
tirely separate agreement, the TRIPS agreement.50 Ecuador claimed
that DSU Article 22.3(b) and (c) allowed it to determine whether it
was practicable to suspend concessions within the same agreement or
under another agreement.51 Ecuador asserted that the discretionary
“party considers” language insulated the decision of where to suspend
concessions from any substantive review by arbitrators.52 Rather, the
arbitrators would be limited to deciding whether the procedural re-
quirements of Article 22.3 had been met.53 The EC, on the other
hand, argued that Article 22.3(b) required Ecuador to submit objec-
tive evidence explaining why it was impracticable to suspend conces-
sions within the same agreement.54
The arbitrators rejected Ecuador’s arguments. They concluded
that, although the “party considers” language “leave[s] a certain mar-
gin of appreciation to the complaining party” with respect to the prac-
ticality and effectiveness of suspending concessions in another sector
or agreement, the “margin of appreciation by the complaining
party . . . is subject to review by the Arbitrators.”55 The arbitrators de-
cided that their “margin of review . . . implies the authority to broadly
judge” whether the complaining party objectively determined that it
could not effectively suspend concessions in the same sector or
48. European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU:
Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000), http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/docs_e.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter European Communities
Under Article 22.6 of the DSU]. Article 22.6 of the DSU enables a country that violated the
GATT to protest the type or amount of concessions suspended by the complaining party and to
submit the dispute to arbitration. DSU, supra note 5, art. 22.6.
49. European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/docs_e.htm (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
50. European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, supra note 48, at 2. TRIPS, or
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, represents an integral
part of the WTO framework, although it is an entirely separate agreement from the GATT.
51. Id. ¶ 22.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. ¶ 23.
55. Id. ¶ 27.
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agreement.56 The arbitrators made it clear that they had authority to
review Ecuador’s decision to suspend concessions under the TRIPS
agreement, despite the deferential language implied by the “party
considers” clause. The arbitrators’ conclusions offer some precedent
indicating how a WTO judicial body might interpret the “it considers”
clause of Article XXI,57 providing some basis for a panel to reject an
argument that a defense based on Article XXI is outside of its juris-
diction.
On the other hand, DSU Article 22.3 may be distinguished from
GATT Article XXI. The arbitrators used a highly contextual ap-
proach to interpret DSU Article 22.3—an approach that relied, in
part, on the mandatory language of the chapeau: “[T]he complaining
party shall apply the following principles and procedures . . . .”58 Addi-
tionally, arbitrators read the potentially self-defining “party consid-
ers” clause to be qualified by language stating that the party may
“seek to suspend concessions.”59 The fact that a party may only “seek”
to suspend concessions implies the existence of some situations in
which it may be unable to do so, perhaps because of some form of
objective review.
This contextual analysis provided the arbitrators with a solid ar-
gument for rejecting the discretionary language of DSU Article 22.3.
Although a WTO panel may use such an approach in examining
GATT Article XXI, it will have difficulty limiting the subjective as-
pect of Article XXI, because the self-defining element of Article XXI
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Although WTO dispute settlement bodies are not bound by the principle of stare deci-
sis, they nonetheless accord some weight to previous interpretations of the provision at hand.
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 265–66.
58. European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, supra note 48, ¶ 27 (quoting
DSU, supra note 5, art. 22.3 (emphasis added)). Additional contextual considerations included
the fact that, the “party considers” clause appears as a subsection, DSU arts. 22.3(b) and 22.3(c),
along with other subsections that require the party seeking to suspend concessions in other sec-
tors or under another agreement to state the reasons for its decision, id. art. 22.3(e), and take
other factors into account, id. art. 22.3(d). These other factors include an examination of the
original GATT violation and the importance of the trade to the violator in that trade sector, as
well as “broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations.”
Id. The latter subsections do not contain the discretionary “party considers” language. Rather,
they appear to be mandatory and reviewable by a WTO panel. Hence the objective review of
the latter factors “inevitably . . . colour[]” the arbitrators’ “margin of review of the complaining
party’s considerations under subparagraphs (b) and (c).” European Communities Under Article
22.6 of the DSU, supra note 48, ¶ 29.
59. European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, supra note 48, ¶ 55 (quoting
DSU, supra note 5, arts. 22.3(b)–(c)).
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appears much stronger than DSU Article 22.3. First, the mandatory
language in the chapeau to Article XXI arguably directs more, not
less, deference to the party claiming the exception.60 Second, in Arti-
cle XXI, the discretionary “it considers” language is situated in the
chapeau to subparagraph (b) of Article XXI. Thus, arguably, the
flexibility and deference such language affords applies to the re-
quirements in subparts (i), (ii), and (iii).61 Finally, unlike Article 22.3,
Article XXI does not include any qualifying language (“seek to sus-
pend concessions”) to limit the prerogatives of parties asserting an
Article XXI defense. Article XXI states that nothing in the GATT
shall prevent a party “from taking any action which it considers neces-
sary.”62
A broader contextual reading of Article XXI, however, suggests
that a WTO panel may nonetheless be able to limit the effect of the
discretionary language in the exception. The new multilateralism em-
bodied in the WTO through its enhanced dispute settlement system
provides some momentum for limiting the discretionary language of
Article XXI. The new emphasis on “legalism” within the WTO sug-
gests a greater likelihood that a panel would use a broader interpreta-
tion to contain the discretionary elements of Article XXI.63 A panel
may reach this “broader” and more limited interpretation by invoking
the larger purposes of the GATT (to liberalize trade and avoid excep-
tions to GATT obligations) and through interpretations of other
60. The chapeau instructs that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed” to prevent
a party from taking action to protect its security interests. GATT, supra note 2, art. XXI. Rather
than placing affirmative duties on a party as part of an authorization process under DSU Article
22.3, the chapeau uses the strong language to preserve the strength and scope of the exception:
“[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed.”
61. This is in contrast to DSU 22.3, which contains the discretionary “party considers” lan-
guage within only a few of the subpart requirements. DSU, supra note 5, arts. 22.3(b)–(e). But
see Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 4, at 438–40 (making structural arguments for why the
broad discretionary language in the chapeau of subparagraph (b) does not extend to subparts
(i), (ii), and (iii)).
62. GATT, supra note 2, art. XXI(b) (emphasis added).
63. See Klinton W. Alexander, The Helms-Burton Act and the WTO Challenge: Making a
Case for the United States Under the GATT National Security Exception, 11 FLA. J. INT’L L. 559,
579–81 (1997) (describing the procedural efficacy of the new WTO dispute settlement system
when compared to the older GATT rules); Cann, supra note 5, at 436–39 (contending that the
multilateralism embodied in the WTO and UN Charter argue against “[t]he unilateral imposi-
tion of security-based sanctions, based upon a self-defining and fluid security exception”); C.
Todd Piczak, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cuba, the National
Security Exception to the GATT and the Political Question Doctrine, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 287,
310–11 (1999) (suggesting that the new legalism in the WTO dispute settlement procedure
would empower a WTO panel to decide an Article XXI defense on the merits).
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GATT provisions. Such a contextual reading that limits the discre-
tionary language of Article XXI may be possible using the interpre-
tive principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.64
Thus, although some textual differences distinguish DSU Article
22.3 from GATT Article XXI, a reading of Article XXI in the context
of the entire GATT agreement and the multilateral emphasis of the
WTO suggests that a WTO panel would likely adjudicate an Article
XXI claim on the merits.
History provides even more evidence that a WTO panel may re-
view the use of an Article XXI defense. During the GATT drafting
process, Article XXI was converted into a separate exception, and it
was noted:
‘It is true that an action taken by a Member under Article [XXI]
could not be challenged in the sense that it could not be claimed that
a Member was violating the Charter; but if that action, even though
not in conflict with the terms of Article [XXI], should affect another
Member, I should think that that Member would have the right to
seek redress of some kind under Article [XXIII] . . . .’65
Although this passage indicates that certain drafters perceived that
parties could not “violate” the GATT when they invoked Article
XXI, it does suggest that those injured from the use of the security
exception could seek some form of redress under Article XXIII. The
passage appears to envision some form of compensation via Article
XXIII processes for a nonviolation that results in a nullification of
benefits.66
Additionally, those who argue that Article XXI is justiciable
point out that national security defenses have been considered under
Article XXIII.67 In 1949, the contracting parties rejected a complaint
64. René E. Browne, Note, Revisiting “National Security” in an Interdependent World: The
GATT Article XXI Defense After Helms-Burton, 86 GEO. L.J. 405, 421–22 (1997); see supra
notes 13–18 and accompanying text.
65. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 6, at 606 (quoting WTO doc. EPCT/A/PV/33, p. 26–
27).
66. See Bhala, supra note 42, at 279 (asserting that a panel may be willing to entertain a
claim for nullification or impairment from a nonviolation, even if it would refuse to adjudicate
an Article XXI defense on the merits, because of sensitive political and diplomatic issues). A
U.S. trade representative has noted that even this interpretation is complicated by the question
of whether parties have “reasonable expectations” that their benefits under the GATT will not
be impaired by the national security considerations of other member nations. ANALYTICAL
INDEX, supra note 6, at 608.
67. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 4, at 432–37.
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brought by Czechoslovakia under Article XXIII(2), alleging that the
United States had illegally imposed a system of export licenses.68 The
United States claimed, among other defenses, that national security
(Article XXI) justified the export regime.69 This defense, however, did
not remove the dispute from the scrutiny, under Article XXIII, of the
other contracting parties.70
Finally, in 1991, the European Communities (EC) invoked Arti-
cle XXI to restrict trade with the states of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.71 Yugoslavia requested a panel under Article
XXIII:2, but the Council suspended the panel until the question of
succession had been resolved between the Socialist Federal Republic
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.72
Both the U.S.-Czechoslovakia and EC-Yugoslavia disputes sug-
gest that Article XXI defenses are subject to Article XXIII. The
Czechoslovakia dispute indicates that the GATT Council was willing
to consider national security claims under Article XXIII at a very
68. Id. at 432.
69. Id.
70. This precedent is somewhat attenuated by the fact that the contracting parties showed
great deference to the United States in deciding it had met its burden for invoking Article XXI.
Id. Such deference could be seen as a weak or uncertain attempt to bring Article XXI under the
umbrella of Article XXIII. But Schloemann and Ohlhoff explain this deference on historical
grounds. They point out that the contracting parties were not anxious to disrupt the newly
formed GATT by scrutinizing national security issues at the beginning of the Cold War. Id. at
433. Despite this tendency to gloss over the substantive issue, they emphasize that the United
States did respond to Czechoslovakian claims that the interpretation of “war material,” GATT,
supra note 2, art. XXI(b)(ii), used by the United States was overly broad. Schloemann &
Ohlhoff, supra note 4, at 433. This response, Schloemann and Ohlhoff suggest, indicates an early
willingness to submit Article XXI exceptions to discussion on the merits. Id.
This contention is weakened in part by subsequent attempts to bring disputes involving an
Article XXI defense before a GATT panel. In 1985, the United States placed a complete import
and export embargo on Nicaragua and justified the measure on national security grounds. Id. at
434. At the request of Nicaragua, the GATT Council established a panel, but they adopted
terms of reference that prohibited the panel from “‘examin[ing] or judg[ing] the validity of or
motivation for the invocation of Article XXI:(b)(iii) by the United States.’” Id. (quoting GATT
Doc. C/M/196, at 7 (1986)). The restrictive terms of reference prevented the panel from even
considering the national security exception of the United States. Frustrated by this lack of
authority to address the substantive issues, the panel did ask whether Article XXI would be suf-
ficiently checked if not subject to Article XXIII. GATT Secretariat, United States—Trade
Measures Affecting Nicaragua, GATT Doc. L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986), para. 5.17, 1986 WL 363154
at *14. Although this dictum is limited by the fact that the Council never adopted the panel re-
port, ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 6, at 604, Schloemann and Ohlhoff emphasize that the
Panel did not reject jurisdiction, but rather, declined to decide the national security question
merely because of the limited terms of reference. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 4, at 435.
71. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 6, at 604 (citing GATT Doc. L/6948).
72. Id.
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early point in GATT history. This is significant given the emphasis
placed on comments made during the formation of the GATT about
the self-defining nature of Article XXI.73 The EC-Yugoslavia dispute
is significant for what did not happen. Although using a national secu-
rity defense, the EC never objected to the establishment of a panel in
its dispute with the former Yugoslavian states.74 This implies that the
EC believes that WTO dispute settlement mechanisms apply to Arti-
cle XXI defenses.
The view that Article XXI is subject to Article XXIII also finds
support in historical statements made by WTO members. In certain
disputes under the GATT, parties have asserted that “‘the provisions
of Article XXI were subject to those of Article XXIII:2,’” and that
they have reserved their rights under Article XXIII to claim relief
from any injury sustained as a result of measures applied on the basis
of Article XXI.75 This argument is bolstered by the fact that other sig-
nificant exceptions to GATT obligations are reviewable under Article
XXIII.76
The foregoing reasons suggest that a WTO panel would not re-
ject jurisdiction over an Article XXI dispute. To reject jurisdiction
would openly suggest an indefinitely large loophole that could seri-
ously weaken the strength of the multilateral commitments made un-
der the WTO. But despite these legitimate bases for asserting juris-
diction, a WTO panel confronting a national security defense may
restrain itself from developing a comprehensive and scrutinizing ju-
risprudence for Article XXI. The panel would likely recognize that,
even if jurisdiction is asserted, the tension inherent in Article XXI is a
necessary feature that must be retained to maintain the delicate bal-
ance between the WTO’s two competing concerns.
Deciphering the ambiguities of Article XXI would require
answering important questions relating to sovereignty and the na-
ture of the WTO.77 Although WTO panels have not avoided po-
73. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
74. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 4, at 436.
75. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 6, at 606 (quoting a discussion of trade measures es-
tablished for noneconomic reasons, which affected Argentina (WTO doc. C/M/157, p. 9)); see
also Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, Nov. 30, 1982, GATT
B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23–24 (“[W]hen action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting par-
ties affected by such action retain their full rights under the General Agreement.”).
76. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
77. Antonio F. Perez asserts that interpretation of Article XXI pits those who see the
WTO as a negotiating body attempting to achieve an even balance of concessions against those
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litical issues,78 these elements become paramount when cloaked in
the vernacular of national security. In fact, the political nature of Ar-
ticle XXI disputes helps to explain the inclusion of self-defining lan-
guage within the exception.79 At the same time, the self-judging lan-
guage creates a concern that the national security exception will
weaken the WTO or swallow the agreements liberalizing free trade.80
Thus, a WTO panel would likely seek to walk the fine line between
these two competing concerns.
The comparison between arguments favoring and disfavoring
WTO jurisdiction over the national security exception demonstrates
that one view does not clearly dominate over the other. The argu-
ments both for and against jurisdiction are real and should not be ig-
nored. A close examination of the issue suggests that WTO members
both understand and utilize this tension when dealing with Article
XXI disputes. Other scholars have catalogued the rationales for and
against WTO jurisdiction and have placed them on the scales in an ef-
fort to determine which rationale carries the substantive weight.81 This
approach, however, does not adequately emphasize the value pro-
vided and the role served by the presence of this productive tension
over the last fifty years. Instead of simply choosing one approach over
another, a proper recognition of the role served by this tension sug-
gests an alternative lesson: a WTO panel must be cautious in ad-
dressing Article XXI defenses, so as to maintain this productive ten-
sion.82 In Part II of the Note, I address how this tension has promoted
settlement of national security disputes under the GATT.
who view the WTO as a quasi-constitutional body with the prerogative of interpreting WTO
agreements and appropriately enforcing such interpretations. Perez, supra note 42, at 306, 312–
24.
78. Paul Stanton Kibel, Awkward Evolution: Citizen Enforcement at the North American
Environmental Commission, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,769, 10,771 (2002) (citing the controversial
health and environmental issues addressed by the WTO Appellate Body in the Hormone-Beef
and Shrimp-Turtle cases, which were claimed to be detrimental to national sovereignty by pro-
testers in Seattle, Washington).
79. See supra Part I.A.
80. See supra Part I.B.
81. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
82. William J. Davey suggests that dispute settlement bodies at the WTO might be well
served in certain circumstances by utilizing “issue-avoidance techniques” such as the common
law doctrines of mootness and ripeness. William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement
System Exceeded Its Authority? A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to Member
Government Decisions and Its Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 79, 96,
99–103 (2001) (arguing that even if a WTO panel has jurisdiction over a dispute involving a re-
gional trading agreement, given the complexities of such a dispute, it may be preferable to allow
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II.  WTO SUCCESS? WHY COUNTRIES MAY PREFER NOT
TO SUBMIT ARTICLE XXI DISPUTES TO A WTO PANEL
In this Part, I first offer several rationales for why Article XXI
has maintained its ambiguous nature and how that ambiguity may
lead to a constructive result. I then examine the national security ex-
ception in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as
an example of another international agreement that adopted the con-
structive ambiguity of GATT Article XXI. Finally, I consider exam-
ples of WTO members who have invoked Article XXI, explaining
how the rationale behind the Article’s ambiguity led the WTO mem-
bers to resolve their disputes.
Even though a WTO panel could arguably claim a legal basis for
asserting jurisdiction over Article XXI claims, it is not clear that this
is an optimal solution. The current fear is that potentially abusive in-
vocations of Article XXI will undermine the GATT’s strength.83
However, commentators have not emphasized how the current ambi-
guity of Article XXI checks abusive invocations through diplomatic
processes.84
A. Rationales for an Ambiguous Article XXI
Several reasons explain why WTO members handle Article XXI
defenses through informal diplomacy, rather than through the dispute
settlement bodies of the WTO. These reasons include (1) the flexibil-
ity that diplomatic resolutions offer, (2) concerns over the unantici-
pated loss of sovereignty, and (3) acknowledgement that the forego-
a WTO committee to handle the issue). Conceivably some matters of national security may re-
solve themselves by the time a WTO panel is prepared to rule on a dispute involving Article
XXI. Similarly, although a panel is not likely to refuse to consider an Article XXI dispute be-
cause of a “political question” doctrine, issues involving political questions may cause a panel to
extend greater deference to the decisions of respective WTO members than it otherwise might.
See id. at 104–05 (noting that the potentially self-defining language of GATT Article XXI may
cause WTO panels or the Appellate Body to give greater deference to the judgment of WTO
members).
83. It should be noted, however, that commentators who point out this flaw generally do
not offer much evidence of actual abuse.
84. Interestingly, the United States indicated that it would have possibly agreed to such a
solution in the debate over parallel imports of drugs by developing nations. Frances Williams,
US May Soften Stance on Cheap Medicines, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 6, 2003, at 5. A U.S.
trade representative reported that “the US had initially been prepared to accept the ‘construc-
tive ambiguity’ of the Doha Declaration,” but that reports of the broad interpretation of the
Declaration by some developing nations foreclosed that option. Id.
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ing factors create incentives to settle such disputes and avoid abuse of
Article XXI.
First, diplomatic resolutions of trade disputes involving national
security issues allow some flexibility in timing that is lost when the
matter is turned over to more formal dispute settlement mechanisms.
To bring a complaint before a WTO panel, a WTO member must
consult with the member against whom it is alleging the violation.85
The members only have to consult for a minimum of sixty days before
requesting adjudication before a third party.86 Additionally, once a
WTO member requests a panel and formally begins the dispute set-
tlement process, other deadlines assure that the settlement process
proceeds in a timely fashion.87 These deadlines facilitate quicker
resolutions to trade issues, but they also create a timetable that may
hinder a more optimal, negotiated resolution. This is particularly true
with Article XXI defenses. These disputes typically contain highly
politicized elements, elements that could be worked through given
the passage of months and even years, but which might be difficult to
resolve under the abbreviated timeframe created for panel and Ap-
pellate Body Reports.88
Second, sovereignty concerns intertwined with questions of na-
tional security may cause WTO members to prefer an ambiguous Ar-
ticle XXI that remains outside the traditional bodies of WTO dispute
settlement.89 “National security” is an elastic and highly contextual
concept—a concept whose flexibility allows it to serve a range of dif-
ferent purposes. For instance, the United States has invoked claims of
85. DSU, supra note 5, art. 4.7.
86. Id.
87. See id. art. 12.8–.9 (instructing a panel to issue its report within six months, with the
possibility of extending the period to nine months); id. art. 17.5 (instructing the Appellate Body
to release its report within sixty days with the possibility of a thirty- day extension).
88. This concern may not be unique to Article XXI defenses, but it is certainly exacerbated
in the Article XXI context because of the political nature of the Article and the fact that WTO
jurisdiction over Article XXI defenses has never been definitively settled.
89. Even in the context of the WTO, the U.S. Congress has insisted upon measures to en-
sure that WTO decisions do not threaten U.S. sovereignty. For example, WTO decisions are not
self-executing under U.S. law, and U.S. trade representatives are required to review and analyze
WTO policies against U.S. interests. See David T. Shapiro, Note, Be Careful What You Wish for:
U.S. Politics and the Future of the National Security Exception to the GATT, 31 GEO. WASH. J.
INT’L L. & ECON. 97, 106–07 (1997) (describing congressional controls over U.S. participation in
the WTO as included in the implementing legislation); see also supra note 42 (suggesting that
Article XXI represented a necessary reservation of sovereignty in the formation of the GATT).
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self-defense and national security to justify the use of force in Iraq.90
Though the application of national security principles in this context
remains contested, the war on terrorism has clearly reshaped the
definition of national security and moved it away from the traditional
state-actor paradigm.91 Some have even tied national security to the
protection of human rights in foreign countries.92 Using unilateral
economic sanctions to prevent violations of human rights may serve
an important purpose by signaling information to third parties and
helping to form international norms of security, even if the sanctions
themselves are not perfectly effective.93
These concerns about maintaining the flexibility of the term “Na-
tional Security” help to explain why the drafters of the GATT know-
ingly left Article XXI as an ambiguous instrument. It also explains
why WTO members reserved sovereign powers in this area. Even
though nations have impliedly surrendered some sovereignty to join
the WTO and take advantage of its benefits, in deciding the question
of whether Article XXI is justiciable, any waiver of sovereignty
should be express and not implied, particularly given its history.94 In
90. US Ambassador Urges France, Germany to Rethink Anti-War Stance, AGENCE FR.–
PRESSE, Feb. 6, 2003 (noting Secretary of State Colin Powell’s expression of concern regarding
Iraq’s arms possessions and potential involvement in terrorism).
91. Nonstate sponsors of terrorism may drive a WTO member to seek recourse in Article
XXI. Some have contended that Al Qaeda has profited from trafficking in diamonds that they
had bought from African rebels seeking funds to fight against their governments. See Tracey
Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, and the Univer-
sality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 8 (2003); Editorial, Sell Diamonds for Love, Not
War, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 2001, at 26. They argue that the war on terrorism is enough to justify
an import ban under Article XXI on diamonds that are not certified to have come from legiti-
mate sources. Price, supra, at 59–62; Sell Diamonds for Love, Not War, supra. The United States
may be able invoke Art. XXI(c) because of UN resolutions to deal with the same problem,
Price, supra, at 59–62, but even in the absence of such resolutions, the United States could ar-
guably resort to Art. XXI(b) to justify such an import ban.
92. See generally Ryan Goodman, Norms and National Security: The WTO as a Catalyst for
Inquiry, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 101 (2001) (arguing for the validity of invocations of GATT Article
XXI to defend unilateral economic sanctions based on foreign human rights violations, because
these violations may represent a legitimate security threat, so that invoking Article XXI is actu-
ally consistent with international security norms).
93. Id. at 116.
94. In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989), the U.S.
Supreme Court made an analogous argument in connection with waiver of immunity to suit in
the United States. A Liberian ship owner, who lost a ship when it was attacked by the Argentine
Air Force, brought suit against Argentina in the United States under the Alien Tort Statute. Id.
at 431–33. The ship owner alleged that Argentina had impliedly waived its immunity to suit un-
der international agreements and that this permitted the owner to sue Argentina in U.S. courts.
Id. at 441–42. Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected this argument and, writing for the Court, decided
that in the context of a treaty, a foreign government cannot impliedly waive its immunity to suit.
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essence, nations may hesitate to submit what they see as important
questions of national security to a WTO panel, where that panel has
its own paradigm of “national security” and where the members have
not expressly surrendered sovereignty.95
The foregoing factors create incentives for WTO members to set-
tle Article XXI matters and to avoid abusive invocations of the ex-
ception. Some signatories to the GATT like the fact that there is an
exception for national security—one that they, and they alone, may
decide when and how to invoke.96 This self-judging exception be-
comes a trump card that could be played for national security issues
of great political importance. Yet it is clear that frequent or abusive
use of this prerogative would undermine the cooperation and obliga-
tions that attach under the GATT.97 Several forces, however, provide
a natural check against the occurrence of such abuses. First, the sim-
ple knowledge that inappropriate use of the exception would under-
cut the GATT helps to curb its abuse.98 A second, and more impor-
tant, check comes from the knowledge that the self-defining
interpretation of Article XXI is not definitively settled, particularly
Id. at 442–43. The doctrine of immunity to suit stems from notions of sovereignty (sovereign
immunity). The United States could argue this position within the context of Article XXI.
95. But see Akande & Williams, supra note 40, at 400–02 (suggesting that other interna-
tional tribunals have successfully adjudicated similar national security exceptions but have done
so giving the invoking nation a wide margin of discretion).
96. Certainly this is evident from the position the United States took in the Nicaragua af-
fair. See GATT Secretariat, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, GATT Doc.
L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986), para. 4.5, 1986 WL 363154, at *4–5 (stating the United State’s position
that Article XXI “left the validity of the security justification to the exclusive judgement [sic] of
the sentencing party taking action” and that the debate over the existence of a security threat
was outside the GATT’s competence).
97. It is not possible to classify easily nations according to these potentially competing
principles. For example, the United States, which has often demonstrated its desire to retain the
self-judging nature of Article XXI, was also one of the advocates for establishing the WTO and
a dispute settlement system that would encourage greater compliance with the GATT and other
trade obligations. See William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United States’
Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1225,
1231 (1998) (arguing that although the United States loses some sovereignty by joining the
WTO, it also receives assurances that trade will occur in compliance with WTO principles).
98. This knowledge motivates correct behavior because of both the fear of destroying the
progress the WTO has made in trade liberalization and the potential reputational costs of inap-
propriately invoking Article XXI. See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic
Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 179, 193-99 (2002) (arguing that reputational costs do affect countries’ decisions to re-
nege on their treaty commitments). Although Professors Schwartz and Sykes contend that repu-
tational costs may be enhanced by a dispute settlement system, id., it is also likely that these
costs are evaluated when nations consider invoking Article XXI—especially given the publicity
that invocations of national security tend to draw.
LINDSAY.DOC 10/10/03 9:38 AM
1300 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1277
since the advent of the WTO. If WTO members want to retain the
traditional flexibility of Article XXI, they know that they must be cir-
cumspect in invoking its protections.
As Part I demonstrated, there are longstanding tensions among
the competing principles of sovereignty, flexibility, and limiting abuse
of GATT Article XXI. The jurisdictional uncertainty of Article XXI
reflects these potentially conflicting interests. Although some scholars
call for jurisdiction and greater jurisprudential clarity by WTO dis-
pute settlement bodies,99 the current ambiguity may lead to a work-
able balance between national sovereignty and multilateral commit-
ment.
B. North American Free Trade Agreement Example
NAFTA exemplifies another international agreement that con-
tains an ambiguous national security exception. Drafted much later
than the GATT, NAFTA deliberately adopted an ambiguous security
exception. Although a WTO panel would not consider the NAFTA
agreement to be binding in an interpretation of GATT Article XXI,
the NAFTA agreement offers evidence that some WTO members
consider an interpretation of Article XXI that acknowledges its con-
structive ambiguity desirable.
Article 2102 of NAFTA contains a national security exception
that is virtually identical to GATT Article XXI.100 The exception
states that, subject to limited exceptions, “nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed . . . to prevent any Party from taking any actions
that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests . . . taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations.”101 The language creates the same interpretive difficulties
that Article XXI faces. NAFTA, however, contains other language
related to its national security exception. For example, NAFTA also
provides, under Chapter Eleven, several exclusions to its arbitration
provisions.102 One of these exclusions states that a state’s decision to
invoke the national security exception and “to prohibit or restrict the
99. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
100. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2102, 32
I.L.M. 605, 699–700 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
101. Id. art. 2102(1)(b)(ii), 32 I.L.M at 605–06.
102. Chapter Eleven addresses arbitrations between individual investors and state signato-
ries to the agreement. For a discussion of how Chapter Eleven arbitration works, see J.C. Tho-
mas, Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, in CANADIAN BAR ASS’N,
NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: LITIGATING AGAINST SOVEREIGNS (2000).
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acquisition of an investment in its territory by an investor of another
Party” is not subject to the dispute settlement mechanisms of
NAFTA Chapter Eleven or Chapter Twenty.103 Thus, the dispute set-
tlement procedures do not apply when NAFTA signatories invoke
the national security exception in actions brought by private investors
to protest restrictions against the acquisition of an investment.
The fact that the parties expressly agreed that the dispute settle-
ment mechanisms would not apply in one instance (vis-à-vis private
investors) suggests that the procedures would apply in the other in-
stance (vis-à-vis another state).104 NAFTA, however, affirmatively
leaves this question open. The dispute settlement exclusion for pri-
vate party actions applies “[w]ithout prejudice to the applicability or
nonapplicability of the dispute settlement provisions” in other actions
involving the invocation of the national security exception.105 Thus,
while NAFTA expressly takes national security defenses against pri-
vate investors out of the dispute settlement mechanisms, it also af-
firmatively leaves open the question of whether such defenses are
subject to dispute settlement in other areas.
In spite of the additional discussion of the national security ex-
ception in Chapter Eleven, the agreement intentionally leaves am-
biguous the question of whether NAFTA dispute settlement proc-
esses cover the invocations of the national security exception by a
state party. It is not surprising that NAFTA parties would exclude is-
sues of national security from an arbitration panel where the com-
plainant is a private investor. These sensitive and diplomatic issues
appropriately lend themselves to settlement between states, as op-
posed to settlements between states and private investors. Neverthe-
less, it is intriguing that the ambiguity over whether the state-to-state
103. NAFTA, supra note 100, art. 1138.1, 32 I.L.M. at 647 (emphasis added).
104. This follows from the principle of interpretation that the expression of one is the exclu-
sion of the other (expressio unius est exclusio alterius). BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed.
1999).
105. NAFTA, supra note 100, art. 1138.1, 32 I.L.M. at 647. NAFTA art. 2102 (national secu-
rity) is subject to an exception (art. 607) for trade of energy between Canada and the United
States; this exception also does not use the self-judging “it considers” language employed in Ar-
ticle 2102. Perez, supra note 42, at 323–27. Perez sees this energy exception as evidence that the
treaty parties considered the broader language of the NAFTA national security exception to be
self-defining. Id.; see also Perez, supra note 5, at 401–05 (distinguishing between NAFTA’s
“general self-judging exception” for national security and its “non-self-judging security excep-
tion” for energy matters). This position appears to be undermined by the language in NAFTA
Article 1138 regarding “the applicability or non-applicability” of the dispute settlement system
under Articles Eleven or Twenty to cases where nations invoke the national security exception.
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dispute settlement mechanisms apply to national security defenses is
affirmatively maintained by NAFTA Article 1138. Certainly, NAFTA
drafters knew of the jurisdictional tension created by the self-defining
language of GATT Article XXI. Yet they nonetheless adopted this
language, and rather than clarifying its meaning, they overtly referred
to the ambiguity it creates. This suggests that the NAFTA parties saw
this ambiguity as an appropriate way to address national security is-
sues.
C. Examples of WTO Members Invoking Article XXI
Several nations have invoked Article XXI, either expressly or
impliedly, both before and after the creation of the WTO. These ex-
amples include the voluntary withdrawal of trade restrictions by Swe-
den; an agreement by Taiwanese officials not to invoke Article XXI
against the People’s Republic of China (PRC); a tentative agreement
between Colombia and Nicaragua to resolve issues before the ICJ;
and the settlement of a dispute between the European Union (EU)
and the United States over the Helms-Burton Act. These situations
exemplify how WTO members may use the current flexibility of Arti-
cle XXI, in conjunction with diplomatic solutions, to resolve Article
XXI disputes. Further, these resolutions demonstrate the benefit of
interpreting Article XXI to reflect its constructive ambiguity.
This informal process of dealing with and checking questionable
invocations of Article XXI is not new to the WTO. It was also used
during the period that preceded the formation of the WTO. For ex-
ample, in November of 1970, Sweden defended its import quota sys-
tem on footwear as necessary for national security.106 It contended:
[The] decrease in domestic production has become a critical threat
to the emergency planning of Sweden’s economic defence [sic] as an
integral part of the country’s security policy. . . . Such [domestic pro-
duction] capacity is indispensable in order to secure the provision of
essential products necessary to meet basic needs in case of war or
other emergency in international relations.107
Other contracting parties in the GATT Council quickly questioned
the legitimacy Swedish measure’s legitimacy and its justification
106. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 6, at 603. Although Sweden never formally invoked
Article XXI, its position was supported by the exception. EBBA DOHLMAN, NATIONAL
WELFARE AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: THE CASE OF SWEDEN’S FOREIGN TRADE
POLICY 35 (1989).
107. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 6, at 603 (quoting GATT Doc. L/4250, p. 3).
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based on national security.108 Sensing international disapproval, Swe-
den quickly offered to hold consultations, and eventually withdrew
the measure within two years.109 Although Sweden did not immedi-
ately withdraw the measure, the two-year lag is not significantly
longer than the average time it takes for a dispute to be resolved un-
der the streamlined processes of the WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem.110
The Swedish example also reflects the importance of diplomatic
pressure under the GATT 1947 rules of dispute resolution. Under
these rules, any member could block the adoption of a panel report.111
The WTO strengthened the dispute resolution system by implement-
ing a rule of reverse consensus in the adoption of panel and Appellate
Body reports.112 On the one hand, this rule appears to lessen the in-
centives of parties to resolve disputes involving Article XXI defenses
informally, because it is easier to obtain relief under the WTO’s judi-
cial mechanisms. On the other hand, the reasons and impulses behind
a self-judging exception have not disappeared. The new WTO proce-
dures do, however, give WTO members challenging the invocation of
Article XXI extra leverage in negotiations.113 The threat of bringing
the matter before a WTO panel strengthens the ability of members to
check any abusive uses of Article XXI, as compared with the position
of the parties under GATT 1947.
The same diplomatic processes that nations use to check Article
XXI defenses after the fact may also be used to curb or prevent their
inappropriate invocation. When Taiwan acceded to the WTO, it con-
fronted a serious economic downturn and the potential loss of jobs
and industry to the PRC.114 During this time, Taiwan also faced
108. John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can Helms-Burton Be Challenged Under WTO?, 27 STETSON L.
REV. 1313, 1331 (1998).
109. Id. Sweden withdrew the quotas with respect to leather and plastic shoes on July 1,
1977. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 6, at 603.
110. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
111. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 263–64.
112. Articles 16.4 and 17.14 of the DSU provide that panel and Appellate Body reports shall
be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body unless there exists a consensus not to adopt the re-
port.
113. These new procedures include the automatic formation of a panel if consultations fail,
time limits for forming panels, panel adoption by reverse consensus, the creation of an Appel-
late Body to review panel reports, provisions that create time limits for compliance, and
authorized retaliation. Alexander, supra note 63, at 579–80.
114. Karen M. Sutter, WTO and the Taiwan Strait: New Considerations for Business, CHINA
BUS. REV., Jan. 1, 2002, at 28.
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“strong international pressure . . . not to liberally invoke Article
[XXI]” upon its accession.115 Two months prior to Taiwan’s accession,
its Prime Minister, Chang Chun-hsiung, responded to the question of
whether Taipei would “invoke national security reasons . . . to ex-
clude any Chinese products.”116 He answered that Taiwan would rely
on already established internal security mechanisms to protect Tai-
wanese financial markets.117 Although Taipei is still free to invoke Ar-
ticle XXI, this international pressure has created a situation in which
its invocation is less likely.118
The diplomatic pressures to settle Article XXI claims also apply
to small nations, as well as the large nations that have significant for-
eign policy operations. In 1999, Honduras and Colombia ratified a
treaty that delineated maritime boundaries.119 Nicaragua, believing
that these boundaries encroached on its territorial rights, instituted a
35 percent tariff on all goods from Honduras and Colombia.120 When
Colombia complained to the WTO, Nicaragua defended on the basis
of Article XXI and its self-defining provisions.121 Colombia requested
a panel122—which the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) granted—but
only after DSB members noted their concern and suggested that the
matter be resolved outside the WTO. Using a potential procedural
impairment, the U.S. representative suggested that the request for a
panel be delayed and that “[t]he parties to the dispute could use this
additional time to try to solve the dispute.”123 Similarly, the Japanese
representative “strongly urged the parties to seek any possible means
in an effort to settle this dispute in other fora outside the WTO.”124
Although the DSB authorized a panel, its members were never se-
115. Id.
116. The View From Taipei; Taiwan’s Prime Minister Chang Chun-hsiung Talks About His
Hopes That WTO Membership Will Open a Dialogue with the Mainland, BUS. WK. ONLINE,
Nov. 8, 2001 (reproducing the transcript of an interview between BusinessWeek Asia Regional
Editor Mark L. Clifford and Prime Minister Chun-hsiung), available at 2001 WL 25755558.
117. Id.
118. See also Qingjiang Kong, Can the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Resolve Trade
Disputes Between China and Taiwan?, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 747, 748, 756–57 (2002) (cautioning
that Taiwan and China face incentives to use and avoid, respectively, the WTO’s dispute settle-
ment mechanisms to forward their own political agendas towards each other).
119. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/78 (Apr. 7, 2000), para. 51.
120. Id. para. 54.
121. Id. paras. 55–61.
122. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Colombia, WT/DS188/2 (Mar. 28, 2000).
123. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/80 (May 18, 2000), para.
31.
124. Id. para. 32.
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lected125 because the parties chose to await resolution of the dispute
before the ICJ.126 While the parties did not informally resolve the dis-
pute, it is apparent that other WTO members advocated such an ap-
proach. Further, the dispute-resolution process finally agreed upon
achieved the same results that an informal resolution would have
achieved. The parties chose to allow the ICJ to address the underlying
issues—an approach that will resolve the underlying issues, while still
maintaining the flexibility of an ambiguous Article XXI.
The Helms-Burton Act, and the accompanying dispute between
the United States and the EC, is the most telling example of how the
impulses for a self-judging security exception combine with the threat
of WTO adjudication to check informally the use of Article XXI. On
February 24, 1996, Cuban jets shot down two unarmed civilian planes,
killing four people, including three American citizens.127 On March 12,
1996, the United States quickly responded by passing the Cuban Lib-
erty and Solidarity Act, popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act.128
The most controversial portions of the Act were Title III and IV.129
Title III made foreign companies liable for damages if they knowingly
trafficked in property that had formerly belonged to U.S. nationals,
but had been confiscated by the Cuban government.130 Title IV man-
dated excluding persons from the United States who have trafficked
in confiscated property or have associated with a business entity that
has been involved with the trafficking of confiscated property.131 The
EU, Canada, and Mexico objected to these measures, labeling them
125. Overview of the Dispute Settlement System, Jan. 22, 2003 (WT/DS/OV/10), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/docs_e.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
126. Maritime Delimitation Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar.
v. Honduras), Application Instituting Proceedings, Dec. 8, 1999, Nicaragua, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/ (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Press Release no. 2002/17, International Court of
Justice, Fixing of Time-Limits for the Filing of a Reply by Nicaragua and Rejoinder by Hondu-
ras (June 18, 2002), at htpp://www.icj-icj.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-17
nh_20020618.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
127. Exiles Commemorate Downing of Planes by Cuba 5 Years Ago, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25,
2001, at C7. The victims were members of a “Miami-based Cuban exile group Brothers to the
Rescue” that scoured the Florida straits in search of Cuban drifters attempting to flee the island.
Warren Richey, A Spy Trial in Miami on a Last Cold-War Front, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Feb. 15, 2001, at 1. Cuba claimed that the planes had provoked the attack by repeatedly violat-
ing Cuban airspace while the United States asserts that the planes were shot down over interna-
tional waters. Exiles Commemorate Downing of Planes by Cuba 5 Years Ago, supra.
128. Alexander, supra note 63, at 563.
129. Id. at 564.
130. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082 (West Supp. 2002).
131. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6091(a) (West Supp. 2002).
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as an extraterritorial attempt to impose U.S. law.132 The EU chal-
lenged the Helms-Burton Act by requesting a panel at the WTO.133
Canada and Mexico also considered challenging the legislation
through NAFTA provisions.134
The United States defended the legislation on national security
grounds, and threatened to invoke Article XXI—even suggesting that
they would refuse to recognize a WTO panel’s jurisdiction over the
question.135 Despite criticism from home and abroad over whether
Cuba really represented a national security threat, the United States
maintained its position.136 Eventually, likely fearful of the potential
consequences of adjudicating an Article XXI dispute before a WTO
panel, the United States and the EU resolved their differences.137
The understanding reached over the Helms-Burton Act called
for President Clinton to waive the application of Title III of the Act
and to seek such waiver authority from Congress for Title IV.138 Addi-
132. Alexander, supra note 63, at 566–69.
133. Blustein, supra note 37, at D10.
134. Alexander, supra note 63, at 568; Kees Jan Kuilwijk, Restrictions Hit Traders, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 10, 1996, at 19. Canada later hesitated to pursue this course to its conclu-
sion. Britain Berates Canadians, FIN. TIMES (London), May 2, 1997, at 4.
135. Guy de Jonquie’res, US Dodges Brussels Onslaught; Washington Buys Time as Anti-
Cuba Law Dispute Goes to World Trade Body, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 21, 1997, at 6.
136. Editorial, Fixing a Bad Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 18, 1997, at A14; US Must Play by
WTO Rules, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Feb. 26, 1997, at 32. Whether Cuba really represents a
national security threat to the United States is an issue that is still being debated. At least one
person suggests that perceptions of Cuba’s threat linger from the Cold War and are maintained
for political reasons (e.g., the common belief that Florida is an important swing state). Maya
Bell, Experts Debate Taking Cuba off Terrorism List, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 7, 2002, at A1.
Others maintain that Cuba’s threat continues in the form of aggressive espionage. Tim Golden,
White House Wary of Cuba’s Little Spy Engine that Could, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at 3; see
also Piczak, supra note 63, at 311–17 (describing arguments for why Cuba may continue to rep-
resent a national security threat to the United States). Certainly terrorism became a prominent
theme at the sentencing hearing of a Cuban spy who allegedly knew about plans by the Cuban
government to shoot down planes operated by the anti-Castro group Brothers to the Rescue.
See Catherine Wilson, U.S. Sentences Cuban Spy to Life in Prison, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 2001, at
22 (quoting the prosecutor as arguing that the actions of the convicted spy were “a crime against
America” and that “[t]he threat was to the country at large and to this community”).
137. Dan Balz, U.S. Eases Stand on Cuba, Iran Sanctions; Helms Condemns, Europe Hails
Move, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998, at A15. The negotiations resulted in a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding that stopped the legal challenge to measures that the United States defended on the
basis of Article XXI. European Union–United States: Memorandum of Understanding Con-
cerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, Apr. 11, 1997,
36 I.L.M. 529, 530.
138. Id. Under the Helms-Burton Act, the president has authority to suspend application of
Title III for up to six months if he gives notice to the appropriate congressional committees and
“[the] suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a
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tionally, the president agreed to waive economic sanctions under the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996139 against three foreign energy
companies seeking to invest in an offshore oil field in Iran.140 In turn,
the EU agreed not to pursue its complaint before the WTO and to
make efforts to “chill” future investment in Cuba.141 True to the
agreement, both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have
continuously suspended application of Title III, despite potential po-
litical repercussions from Cuban Americans.142 Legislation granting
presidential waiver power for Title IV, however, has not passed, due
to stiff opposition from Congress. The defeat of this legislation,
though, may not represent a breach of the agreement, because the
U.S.-EU understanding may have been based only on a promise to
seek such authority and not on its realization.143
This resolution is an example of a situation where diplomatic
pressures have achieved a satisfactory result without necessitating
involvement by WTO adjudicatory bodies. Much has been said about
the advantages embodied by the advent of the new legalism in
international trade that has developed since the establishment of the
WTO.144 In this particular context, at least one scholar has advocated
expanding this legalism to encompass Article XXI claims, and has
even suggested specific principles under which a WTO panel could
evaluate an Article XXI defense.145 These principles represent a
transition to democracy in Cuba.” 22 U.S.C.A. § 6085(c) (West Supp. 2002). The president may
make additional suspensions as necessary. Id.
139. Pub. L. No. 104–172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996). This Act also gives the president the power
to suspend the application of these economic sanctions. Id. § 4(c), 110 Stat. at 1542; id. § 9(c),
110 Stat. at 1547–48.
140. Alexander, supra note 63, at 569–70; Balz, supra note 137, at A15.
141. Balz, supra note 137, at A15.
142. Rafael Lorente, Bush Puts Brake on Cuba Law; Trade War Could Result, Critics Say,
SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), July 17, 2001, at A1.
143. Michael S. Lelyveld, Lawmakers Eye Leash on Clinton over Waivers, J. COM., May 22,
1998, at A1.
144. For a discussion of the arguments for and against the legalism embodied by the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, see Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the
World Trade Organization: Lessons from the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 775, 791–95 (1999).
145. See generally Cann, supra note 5 (acknowledging that although the WTO may not yet
be prepared to adjudicate Article XXI claims, his suggested principles may provide a future
framework). Cann’s principles include: considerations of whether the target of the national se-
curity measure is a developing nation, id. at 442–44; the impact of the measure on the target and
other parties, especially long-run consequences, id. at 446–47, 457–58; the likelihood of the
measure’s success in light of its goals, id. at 447–49; the consistency with which the security
measure is applied to target nations in like circumstances, id. at 450–52; and exhibition of good
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careful attempt to distinguish genuine national security threats from
the conduct intended to effect broader foreign policy goals.146 In
essence, this proposal attempts to sort out “justified” or “true”
invocations of Article XXI from their counterfeit cousins. Although
this approach is appealing because it offers a way to measure an
Article XXI defense and a means to enforce its abuses, the approach
also creates unfavorable rigidity in the fluid field of national security.
WTO members may be uncomfortable submitting claims of national
security to a WTO panel that does not acknowledge the need for
some flexibility in this area.147
Even though these members may desire a panel review when
they are challenging an Article XXI defense, the inevitability of un-
known future emergencies arising suggests some wisdom exists in
having an Article XXI defense in one’s back pocket. For instance, al-
though the EU recently criticized the United States’s argument that
Article XXI is self-defining, the United Kingdom made the same ar-
gument in connection with its confrontation with Argentina over the
Falkland Islands.148 These concerns may prevent WTO members from
rushing to embrace the new legalism for issues of national security.
faith in applying the measure, id. at 452. This analysis borrows from the WTO jurisprudence
that has developed around exceptions in GATT Article XX. Cann, supra note 5, at 452–54. It is
not clear that this analysis would import easily into Article XXI. The consistency principle, for
example, finds express support in the chapeau to Article XX but not in Article XXI. GATT,
supra note 2, art. XX (providing that the exception is “[s]ubject to the requirement that such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail”). Arguably, it is ques-
tionable whether consistency should play the same role in the politics-laden world of national
security. See Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Require-
ments: A Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 366–68 (2002) (noting that although consis-
tency analysis may help to resolve certain Article XX claims, the analysis also presents several
difficulties even in the more straight-forward scientific context of Article XX).
146. See Cann, supra note 5, at 433 (“While the [WTO] agreement does indeed provide
some exceptions, including one for the protection of essential security interests, it does not pro-
vide an exception for the achievement of foreign policy goals or for the advancement of a par-
ticular ideology.”). But see STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN
TRADE POLICY 15 (2d. ed. 2003) (noting that “[t]here is growing consensus that economic
strength is now an integral part of the national security equation,” and giving examples of how
the United States hesitated to impose barriers to trade on steel because the United Kingdom
and Russia, both steel exporters, were considered important allies during recent hostilities in
Afghanistan).
147. See Akande & Williams, supra note 40, at 403 (concluding that a WTO panel would
likely have jurisdiction over Article XXI defenses but acknowledging that “one needs to adopt
an approach which is sensitive to the wording of [Article XXI] and which does not ignore the
intention of the drafters to leave flexibility to States invoking that provision”).
148. See supra notes 36 and 133 and accompanying text.
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The resolution of the Helms-Burton dispute demonstrates that
diplomatic pressures may also be used to sort out the appropriate
from the inappropriate uses of Article XXI. Most in the international
community scoffed at the idea that Cuba represented a national secu-
rity threat to the United States.149 Also, many have pointed out the
apparent futility of U.S. economic sanctions in ousting Cuban leader
Fidel Castro.150 These arguments carry considerable support and
merit. Nevertheless, whether out of a sincere belief that Cuba repre-
sents a threat to U.S. interests or out of political desires to court the
Cuban American vote, the U.S. Congress saw the legislation as im-
portant enough to defend on national security grounds.151 Review by
WTO dispute settlement bodies may have found that Article XXI did
not justify the legislation. However, such a decision would also have
negative consequences, creating a zero-sum game with a winner, the
EU, and a loser, the United States. The loss may have engendered
further resentment against the WTO amidst claims of encroachment
on the national sovereignty of the United States. The diplomatic solu-
tion was beneficial because it took the pressure off the WTO, while
still achieving a reasonable result.
The understanding reached between the United States and the
EU is not above scrutiny. On its face, the settlement appears strange
or even bizarre: a president who agrees not to enforce a law that
Congress insists should be enforced; a Congress that refuses to do
anything about the nonenforcement; and an EU that initially com-
plains about the law but agrees not to retaliate.152 This strange settle-
ment, however, allowed each side to announce that it achieved its
aims. The EU claimed that the agreement effectively neutralized the
Helms-Burton Act, while the United States asserted that the under-
standing furthered the foundational principles of the Act.153 This dip-
149. Reginald Dale, U.S. Is Wrong over Cuba, as Usual, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 8, 1996,
at 13. This contention is not without its detractors. See supra note 136.
150. Thomas W. Lippman, Drive to Change U.S. Stance on Cuba Intensifies, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 1998, at A16; Michael Zamba, Helms-Burton Law Strengthened Castro, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 5, 1997, at 27A.
151. See Piczak, supra note 63, at 305–07 (describing domestic concerns confronting Presi-
dent Clinton and the U.S. Congress when adopting the Helms-Burton Act); see also Perez, su-
pra note 5, at 400 (contending that both international and domestic institutional structures must
be considered when framing the elements that constitute policy involving both trade and na-
tional security concerns).
152. Richard Lawrence, Helms, Burton and Kafka, J. COM., Aug. 19, 1998, at A7.
153. Pascal Fletcher, Cuba ‘Need Not Fear’ US-EU Deal, FIN. TIMES (London), June 12,
1998, at 6. The EU saw the Act as essentially neutralized, because President Clinton agreed to
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lomatic technique—reconciling differences while failing to eliminate
the underlying cause of the dispute—is not unique to issues of na-
tional security; it is a common tool used to settle other types of trade
differences.154 Such diplomatic settlements do produce significant con-
sequences; here, the EU eliminated most of the negative effects of the
Helms-Burton Act, and the United States kept the Act and main-
tained its position against Cuba. In addition, such diplomatic settle-
ments permit a flexibility of discussion and compromise that provides
time for the dispute to fade from public view, a result which is often
not possible with more formal adjudicatory processes.155
CONCLUSION
Article XXI was created in ambiguity—an ambiguity necessi-
tated by the need to allow countries the ability to respond to legiti-
mate security concerns without destroying advances in trade liberali-
suspend application of Title III and the State Department sparsely used its powers under Title
IV, thus engaging in “a de facto Title IV waiver.” Lawrence, supra note 152, at A7. The United
States saw its victory in the EU’s agreement not to adjudicate its WTO complaint and not to
support European investors in investing in Cuban property claimed by U.S. nationals. Fletcher,
supra, at 6. But see Sarah Ryle, Business Focus: America’s Door Policy: Red Light, OBSERVER,
June 3, 2001, at 5 (describing how several prominent British businessmen were denied entrance
into the United States based on Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act). It has allowed the United
States to continue to argue that Article XXI is self-defining. See Preview of Upcoming World
Trade Organization Ministerial in Seattle, Washington, Hearing of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee (Sept. 29, 1999), Federal News Service, at 20 (“[T]he WTO has a provision for exceptions to
national security. . . . It is a self-defining exception. . . . The WTO, obviously, doesn’t have any-
thing to say about a country’s determination of its own national security needs.” (comments by
Charlene Barshefsky, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Representative)).
154. See Helpful Fudge, FIN. TIMES (London), July 15, 2002, at 16 (noting that diplomatic
settlements buy time for the dispute to pass over, even if they do not immediately address the
underlying source of tension). The Financial Times pointed out that the United States and the
EU recognize their trade interdependence, so that when push comes to shove in trade disputes,
both parties are willing in fact—even if not in appearance—to back down. Id. The Financial
Times cited the dispute over the EU banana regime as just such an instance—although the
WTO resolved the issue, in the end, the United States accepted a regime “not greatly different
from its predecessor.” Id.
155. Of course, diplomatic compromise and adjudicatory processes are not mutually exclu-
sive. Hugo Paemen, a former EU ambassador to the United States, noted that one of the pur-
poses for the WTO dispute settlement procedures is that “it encourages the parties to come to
an agreement before the work of the panel is finished.” Blustein, supra note 37, at D10. Even
the United States, which has staunchly maintained that Article XXI is self-defining and outside
the jurisdiction of a WTO panel, praises the new legalism. See Preview of Upcoming World
Trade Organization Ministerial in Seattle, Washington, supra note 153, at 2 (“[The WTO] has
advanced the rule of law with a strong dispute settlement system that has helped us significantly
improve our enforcement of trade commitments.” (comments of Ambassador Charlene
Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representative)).
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zation. One of the participants in the drafting of the original GATT
Charter recognized this tension: “[W]e thought it well to draft provi-
sions which would take care of real security interests and, at the same
time, so far as we could, to limit the exception so as to prevent the
adoption of protection for maintaining industries under every con-
ceivable circumstance.”156 Commentators, acknowledging this tension,
have increasingly attempted to remedy the situation by marshalling
arguments to support jurisdiction over Article XXI by the WTO dis-
pute settlement bodies. To fully understand the tension, it is impor-
tant to assess carefully the arguments both favoring and disfavoring
WTO jurisdiction over Article XXI.
Arguments disfavoring jurisdiction include the discretionary “it
considers” language of Article XXI itself. International tribunals,
such as the ICJ, have emphasized the significance of this language.
The argument for a discretionary exception also finds support from
analogous arguments developing nations are making about the self-
defining element of “emergency” in the Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health. Finally, historical statements made by WTO members
also support a self-judging Article XXI.
Arguments favoring jurisdiction include textual efforts to con-
strue Article XXI in a way that limits the reach of its self-judging lan-
guage. A recent WTO arbitration between Ecuador and the EC over
the suspension of concessions suggests that a WTO panel may be
open to this interpretation. The arbitration rejected attempts by Ec-
uador to invoke self-judging language to justify the manner in which
Ecuador suspended concessions. History also provides several in-
stances in which WTO or GATT bodies have considered Article XXI
claims under the dispute settlement provisions of Article XXIII.
156. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 6, at 600. This concern continues today; a July, 2001
report by the European Union on barriers to trade “acknowledged that the principle of national
security was an important element of trade policy,” but it complained “that national security
concerns are used by the US to exclude foreign contractors from defence business, beyond ex-
emptions allowed under World Trade Organisation procedures.” EU Voiced Concern on US
‘Protectionism’, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 6, 2002, at 9. Of course, others contend that legiti-
mate security interests are being threatened by the specter of a narrow reading of Article XXI.
One commentator has noted that the United States included an exception to GATT 1994 for
the Jones Act, which “reserves shipping between U.S. ports to ships built in U.S. shipyards,”
and which is necessary for the United States to maintain the shipbuilding capacity to support a
strong navy. William R. Hawkins, The WTO as Battleground: A Realist Revival, WORLD AND I,
March 1, 2001. Yet, Japan and the EU have led calls for the United States to justify the GATT
waiver since the requisite five-year review of the waiver. Id.
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Several commentators have evaluated these arguments and have
concluded that a WTO panel should accept jurisdiction over a na-
tional security defense.157 Although the WTO is unlikely to reject ju-
risdiction over such a defense, this framework ignores the relative
success achieved by the constructive ambiguity of Article XXI. De-
spite almost fifty years under the GATT and nine years under the
WTO, the basic understanding of Article XXI has not significantly
changed. Article XXI is as ambiguous today as it was in 1947. Yet, de-
spite this ambiguity, the GATT continues to function and trade liber-
alization continues.
Rather than hindering trade, nations may appreciate certain vir-
tues in the ambiguous interpretation of Article XXI. WTO members
may prefer to address the national security exception with less formal
methods. These informal methods permit greater flexibility in timing
and response, protect real and perceived concerns over national sov-
ereignty, and provide the necessary checks against abusive overuse of
Article XXI claims. This preference is detected, for example, in the
development of NAFTA, where the parties deliberately chose to
maintain an ambiguous national security exception. The parties
adopted this interpretation in spite of the “problems” of Article
XXI—“problems” highlighted by commentators over the long history
of the GATT.
While an ambiguous Article XXI is not free from abuse, history
suggests that the ambiguity is often a constructive one. Nations have
checked informally perceived abuses of Article XXI in several in-
stances. The GATT community persuaded Sweden to withdraw its
national security protection over shoes. WTO members have been
successful in persuading Taiwan not to invoke the Article in connec-
tion with the accession of the People’s Republic of China to the
WTO. Colombia and Nicaragua have submitted their border dispute
to the ICJ in lieu of arguing the matter in the WTO. Finally, the
United States and the EC reached a settlement in their dispute over
the Helms-Burton Act.
The ambiguity of Article XXI has not necessarily frustrated im-
plementation of the GATT. It may not produce perfect results, but
such results often depend on the time, place, and perspective of the
parties. This is particularly true in the arena of national security. As
the WTO matures, it will inevitably face more arguments over the
157. Cann, supra note 5, at 420; Perez, supra note 5, at 408–10; Schloemann & Ohlhoff, su-
pra note 4, at 426–27.
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proper interpretation of Article XXI. These arguments are important
and may affect the future understanding of who is to interpret the na-
tional security exception. But the arguments should not overlook the
advantages of an ambiguous exception—advantages recognized by
both the framers and the players in the arena of international trade.
